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oF PRIVACY-STATUS OF THE LAw IN MICHIGAN-LIABILITY FOR CoMUs:s OF PHOTOGRAPH-Defendant published plaintiff's photograph in
connection with a cosmetics advertisement in a Detroit newspaper. Plaintiff sought
damages, alleging that she neither knew of nor assented to the publication of the
photograph, that the publication constituted an invasion of her right to be free
from offensive publicity, and that she had suffered consequential damages. The
trial court sustained defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint stated no cause of action. On appeal, held, reversed and remanded. Plaintiff stated a cause of action for invasion of her right of privacy. Pallas v. Crowley,
Milner & Co., 322 Mich. 411, 33 N.W. (2d) 911 (1948).
In the early case of DeMay v. Roberts,1 where plaintiff sought damages for
defendant's intrusion into her home while she was in c}lildbirth, the court indicated support of a right of privacy, although recovery was allowed on other
grounds. Later, however, this dictum was ignored in Atkinson v. John E. Doherty
& Co., 2 where the Michigan court clearly denied the existence of such a right in
a suit to enjoin commercial use of the name and likeness of plaintiff's deceased
husband.3 In Millerv. Gillespie,4 the next Michigan case to consider the question,
injunctive relief for the protection of a right of privacy was denied, but the court
seemed to recognize that such relief would be available in a proper case;5 the
Atkinson case was mentioned but not discussed. The principal case appears to be
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146 Mich. 160 at 165, 9 N.W. 146 (1881). In speaking of plaintiff's right of privacy
the court stated, "The plaintiff had a legal right to the privacy of her apartment at such a
time, and the law secures to her this right by requiring others to observe it, and to abstain
from its violation."
2-121 Mich. 372, 80 N.W. 285 (1899).
3 The court expressly refused to limit its decision to narrower ground than a complete
repudiation of the privacy doctrine. The following distinctions were rejected: (1) that if
the deceased did have a right of privacy, it was a personal right which terminated with his
death; (2) that the deceased had surrendered an existing right of privacy by his admitted
prominence in public life; (3) that injunctive relief was not a proper remedy for invasion
of the right of privacy if it existed.
4196 Mich. 423, 163 N.W. 22 (1917).
_5 Id. at 428; " .•. without denying the jurisdiction of a court of equity to afford a remedy
for wrongful invasion of privacy, [I] conclude that the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief
asked for."
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the only other Michigan decision considering the right of privacy, and the court
here accepts without reluctance the existence of the right. The court gives qualified approval to the general rule proposed by theTorts Restatement,6 and overrules the Atkinson case "to the extent that it is inconsistent with the conclusion
reached herein;" 7 it would appear that the Atkinson case, resting on the broad
ground that no right of privacy exists, is utterly inconsistent with the principal
case. Recognition of the right in Michigan seems limited to the following: the
principal case recognizes a right to recover damages for unauthorized commercial
exploitation of one's likeness; the Miller case recognizes a carefully limited right to
injunction against disclosures of one's likeness and identity under circumstances
which will expose him to undeserved disgrace and ridicule; DeMay 11. Roberts
acknowledges by dictum a right to be free from actual intrusion into intimate
events in one's life. These Michigan cases have all involved intentional action by
the defendant, though the decisions have not stressed this fact. The principal case
indicates that consent is a good defense, and also seems to affirm that freedom of
speech and press and legitimate public interest in news constitute limitations on
the right. Since the court in the principal case seems to recognize privacy as an
independent common law right, application of the doctrine will probably be free
of limitations placed upon it in some jurisdictions which derive the right from
statutory and other bases. 8 To this extent, the Michigan doctrine seems progressive.
On the •other hand, all jurisdictions which recognize the right of privacy seem
willing to go at least as far as the holding in the principal case.0 The Michigan
court has yet to deal with cases involving disclosure of private affairs by newspapers and the like, where the personal right of privacy con8icts with the public
interest in news and with freedom of speech and press;10 nor has the criterion
been settled for distinguishing actionable disclosures and exploitations of private
affairs from those which are too trivial for liability.11 If the future development of
the Michigan privacy doctrine parallels the current trend in other jurisdictions,
however, a broader recognition of the right than that of the principal case seems
probable.12

Thomas L. Waterbury
6 4 ToRTS REsTATEMENT §867 (1939); "A person who unreasonably and seriously
interferes with another's interest in not having his affairs known to others or his likeness
exhibited to the public is liable to the other."
7 Principal case at 417.
s See 138 A.L.R. 30-35 (1942).
o Nizer, "The Right of Privacy, A Half Century's Developments," 39 MxcH. L. REv.
526 at 547 (1941).
10 Id. at 528-29.
11 In 138 A.L.R. 46-47 (1942), it is suggested that the criterion of actionable injury is
the reasonableness of the interference with plaintiff's right; since the ToRTS RESTATEMENT,
supra, note 6, indorses this view, it would seem that the Michigan court has accepted this
standard.
12 Feinberg, "Recent Developments in the Law of Privacy," 48 CoL. L. REv. 713 at
713-16 (1948). This article, together witp. those cited in potes 8 and 9 supra, offers a good
discussion of privacy law in general.

